Leonard Berry, earned his Doctorate from the University of Bristol, England, with studies focusing on East and South Asia tropical environment. Twelve years residence in Eastern Africa at various university positions drew him towards an interest in natural resource management, rural development applied problems and regional planning problems.
At Clark University, Massachusetts, in 1970 he served as Professor of Geography, Graduate School of Geography Director and Provost before leaving Clark for Florida Atlantic University in 1987. In 1994 he was appointed Director of the Florida Center for Environmental Studies (CES) a state-wide center of the Florida State University System which focuses on critical environmental management, as well as education and outreach issues in Florida and in tropical, subtropical ecosystems worldwide. He has been centrally involved with global issues of land degradation and is an advisor to the Global Environmental Facility on this topic. He has studied issues of climate change in Africa and the U.S. for the past twenty years, organized a workshop on climate change in Florida in January 2006 and a state-wide conference on climate change in Florida, May 2007, in Tampa, Florida.
Dr. Berry has authored/edited 21 books, over 250 professional papers and reports and has been a consultant for UNEP, UNDP, World Bank, UNESCO, Global Mechanism and others.
The Wisconsin Society for Ornithology was organized in 1939 to encourage the study of Wisconsin birds. The aims have since expanded to emphasize all of the many enjoyable aspects of birding and to support the research and habitat protection necessary to preserve Wisconsin birdlife. WSO strives to alert members and the public to situations and practices that threaten Wisconsin's bird populations. Members include those who enjoy birds attracted to their homes by feeders and bird houses, those who pursue field study or bird banding as a hobby, and those who engage in ornithology professionally. Membership exceeds 1500 from across the United States and around the world.
The WSO publishes The Passenger Pigeon, a quarterly journal featuring a wide range of articles on Wisconsin birds, seasonal field sightings including Christmas, May and Big Day counts, and scientific research reports. Reports from birders throughout the state on unusual and interesting sightings and articles on all aspects of birding are included regularly.
Website: Homepage
Originally Published As:
Title: Energy and Economic Myths
Author: Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen
Source: Southern Economic Journal, volume 41, no. 3
Year published: 1975
EDITOR'S NOTE: The Hungarian-born mathematician and economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen was the first to formally demonstrate the thermodynamic foundations of the economic process. He had a profound influence on leading alternative economic theorists such as Herman Daly, one of the founders of the field of ecological economics.
Hardly anyone would nowadays openly profess a belief in the immortality of mankind. Yet many of us prefer not to exclude this possibility; to this end, we endeavor to impugn any factor that could limit mankind's life. The most natural rallying idea is that mankind's entropic dowry is virtually inexhaustible, primarily because of man's inherent power to defeat the Entropy Law in some way or another.
To begin with, there is the simple argument that, just as has happened with many natural laws, the laws on which the finiteness of accessible resources rests will be refuted in turn. The difficulty of this historical argument is that history proves with even greater force, first, that in a finite space there can be only a finite amount of low entropy and, second, that low entropy continuously and irrevocably dwindles away. The impossibility of perpetual motion (of both kinds) is as firmly anchored in history as the law of gravitation.
More sophisticated weapons have been forged by the statistical interpretation of thermodynamic phenomena – an endeavor to reestablish the supremacy of mechanics propped up this time by a sui generis notion of probability. According to this interpretation, the reversibility of high into low entropy is only a highly improbable, not a totally impossible event. And since the event is possible, we should be able by an ingenious device to cause the event to happen as often as we please, just as an adroit sharper may throw a "six" almost at will. The argument only brings to the surface the irreducible contradictions and fallacies packed into the foundations of the statistical interpretation by the worshipers of mechanics.[1] The hopes raised by this interpretation were so sanguine at one time that P W Bridgman, an authority on thermodynamics, felt it necessary to write an article just to expose the fallacy of the idea that one may fill one's pockets with money by "bootlegging entropy".[2]
Occasionally and sotto voce some express the hope, once fostered by a scientific authority such as John von Neumann, that man will eventually discover how to make energy a free good, "just like the unmetered air".[3] Some envision a "catalyst" by which to decompose, for example, the sea water into oxygen and hydrogen, the combustion of which will yield as much available energy as we would want. But the analogy with the small ember which sets a whole log on fire is unavailing. The entropy of the log and the oxygen used in the combustion is lower than that of the resulting ashes and smoke, whereas the entropy of water is higher than that of the oxygen and hydrogen after decomposition. Therefore, the miraculous catalyst also implies entropy bootlegging.[4]
With the notion, now propagated from one syndicated column to another, that the breeder reactor produces more energy than it consumes, the fallacy of entropy bootlegging seems to have reached its greatest currency even among the large circles of literati, including economists. Unfortunately, the illusion feeds on misconceived sales talk by some nuclear experts who extol the reactors which transform fertile but nonfissionable material into fissionable fuel as the breeders that "produce more fuel than they consume".[5] The stark truth is that the breeder is in no way different from a plant which produces hammers with the aid of some hammers. According to the deficit principle of the Entropy Law ... even in breeding chickens a greater amount of low entropy is consumed than is contained in the product.[6]
Apparently in defense of the standard vision of the economic process, economists have set forth themes of their own. We may mention first the argument that "the notion of an absolute limit to natural resource availability is untenable when the definition of resources changes drastically and unpredictably over time ... A limit may exist, but it can be neither defined nor specified in economic terms".[7] We also read that there is no upper limit even for arable land because "arable is infinitely indefinable".[8] The sophistry of these arguments is flagrant. No one would deny that we cannot say exactly how much coal, for example, is accessible. Estimates of natural resources have constantly been shown to be too low. Also, the point that metals contained in the top mile of the earth's crust may be a million times as much as the present known reserves[9] does not prove the inexhaustibility of resources, but, characteristically, it ignores both the issues of accessibility and disposability.[10] Whatever resources or arable land we may need at one time or another, they will consist of accessible low entropy and accessible land. And since all kinds together are in finite amount, no taxonomic switch can do away with that finiteness.
The favorite thesis of standard and Marxist economists alike, however, is that the power of technology is without limits.[11] We will always be able not only to find a substitute for a resource which has become scarce, but also to increase the productivity of any kind of energy and material. Should we run out of some resources, we will always think up something, just as we have continuously done since the time of Pericles.[12] Nothing, therefore, could ever stand in the way of an increasingly happier existence of the human species. One can hardly think of a more blunt form of linear thinking. By the same logic, no healthy young human should ever become afflicted with rheumatism or any other old-age ailments; nor should he ever die. Dinosaurs, just before they disappeared from this very same planet, had behind them not less than one hundred and fifty million years of truly prosperous existence. (And they did not pollute environment with industrial waste!) But the logic to be truly savored is Solo's.[13] If entropic degradation is to bring mankind to its knees sometime in the future, it should have done so sometime after AD 1000. The old truth of Seigneur de La Palice has never been turned around – and in such a delightful form.[14]
In support of the same thesis, there also are arguments directly pertaining to its substance. First, there is the assertion that only a few kinds of resources are "so resistant to technological advance as to be incapable of eventually yielding extractive products at constant or declining cost".[15] More recently, some have come out with a specific law which, in a way, is the contrary of Malthus's law concerning resources. The idea is that technology improves exponentially.[16] The superficial justification is that one technological advance induces another. This is true, only it does not work cumulatively as in population growth. And it is terribly wrong to argue, as Maddox does,[17] that to insist on the existence of a limit to technology means to deny man's power to influence progress. Even if technology continues to progress, it will not necessary exceed any limit; an increasing sequence may have an upper limit. In the case of technology this limit is set by the theoretical coefficient of efficiency ... If progress were indeed exponential, then the input i per unit of output would follow in time the law i = i0(1 + r) - t and would constantly approach zero. Production would ultimately become incorporeal and the earth a new Garden of Eden.
Finally, there is the thesis which may be called the fallacy of endless substitution: "Few components of the earth's crust, including farm land, are so specific as to defy economic replacement; ... nature imposes particular scarcities, not an inescapable general scarcity".[18] Bray's protest notwithstanding,[19] this is "an economist's conjuring trick". True, there are only a few "vitamin" elements which play a totally specific role such as phosphorus plays in living organisms. Aluminum, on the other hand, has replaced iron and copper in many, although not in all uses.[20] However, substitution within a finite stock of accessible low entropy whose irrevocable degradation is speeded up through use cannot possibly go on forever.
In Solow's hands, substitution becomes the key factor that supports technological progress even as resources become increasingly scarce. There will be, first, a substitution within the spectrum of consumer goods. With prices reacting to increasing scarcity, consumers will buy "fewer resource-intensive goods and more of other things".[21] More recently, he extended the same idea to production, too. We may, he argues, substitute "other factors for natural resources".[22] One must have a very erroneous view of the economic process as a whole not to see that there are no material factors other than natural resources. To maintain further that "the world can, in effect, get along without natural resources" is to ignore the difference between the actual world and the Garden of Eden.
More impressive are the statistical data invoked in support of some of the foregoing theses. The data adduced by Solow[23] show that in the United States between 1950 and 1970 the consumption of a series of mineral elements per unit of GNP decreased substantially. The exceptions were attributed to substitution but were expected to get in line sooner or later. In strict logic, the data do not prove that during the same period technology necessarily progressed to a greater economy of resources. The GNP may increase more than any input of minerals even if technology remains the same, or even if it deteriorates. But we also know that during practically the same period, 1947-1967, the consumption per capita of basic materials increased in the United States. And in the world, during only one decade, 1957-1967, the consumption of steel per capita grew by 44 percent.[24] What matters in the end is not only the impact of technological progress on the consumption of resources per unit of GNP, but especially the increase in the rate of resource depletion, which is a side effect of that progress.
Still more impressive – as they have actually proved to be – are the data used by Barnett and Morse to show that, from 1870 to 1957, the ratios of labor and capital costs to net output decreased appreciably in agriculture and mining, both critical sectors as concerns depletion of resources.[25] In spite of some arithmetical incongruities,[26] the picture emerging from these data cannot be repudiated. Only its interpretation must be corrected.
For the environmental problem it is essential to understand the typical forms in which technological progress may occur. A first group includes the economy innovations, which achieve a net economy of low entropy – be it by a more complete combustion, by decreasing friction, by deriving a more intensive light from gas or electricity, by substituting materials costing less in energy for others costing more, and so on. Under this heading we should also include the discovery of how to use new kinds of accessible low entropy. A second group consists of substitution innovations, which simply substitute physicochemical energy for human energy. A good illustration is the innovation of gunpowder, which did away with the catapult. Such innovations generally enable us not only to do things better but also (and especially) to do things which could not be done before – to fly in airplanes, for example. Finally, there are the spectrum innovations, which bring into existence new consumer goods, such as the hat, nylon stockings, et cetera. Most of the innovations of this group are at the same time substitution innovations. In fact, most innovations belong to more than one category. But the classification serves analytical purposes.
Now, economic history confirms a rather elementary fact – the fact that the great strides in technological progress have generally been touched off by a discovery of how to use a new kind of accessible energy. On the other hand, a great stride in technological progress cannot materialize unless the corresponding innovation is followed by a great mineralogical expansion. Even a substantial increase in the efficiency of the use of gasoline as fuel would pale in comparison with a manifold increase of the known, rich oil fields.
This sort of expansion is what has happened during the last one hundred years. We have struck oil and discovered new coal and gas deposits in a far greater proportion than we could use during the same period. Still more important, all mineralogical discoveries have included a substantial proportion of easily accessible resources. This exceptional bonanza by itself has sufficed to lower the real cost of bringing mineral resources in situ to the surface. Energy of mineral source thus becoming cheaper, substitution innovations have caused the ratio of labor to net output to decline. Capital also must have evolved toward forms which cost less but use more energy to achieve the same result. What has happened during this period is a modification of the cost structure, the flow factors being increased and the fund factors decreased.[27] By examining, therefore, only the relative variations of the fund factors during a period of exceptional mineral bonanza, we cannot prove either that the unitary total cost will always follow a declining trend or that the continuous progress of technology renders accessible resources almost inexhaustible – as Barnett and Morse claim.[28]
Little doubt is thus left about the fact that the theses examined in this section are anchored in a deep-lying belief in mankind's immortality. Some of their defenders have even urged us to have faith in the human species: such faith will triumph over all limitations.[29] But neither faith nor assurance from some famous academic chair[30] could alter the fact that, according to the basic law of thermodynamics, mankind's dowry is finite. Even if one were inclined to believe in the possible refutation of these principles in the future, one still must not act on that faith now. We must take into account that evolution does not consist of a linear repetition, even though over short intervals it may fool us into the contrary belief.
A great deal of confusion about the environmental problem prevails not only among economists generally (as evidenced by the numerous cases already cited), but also among the highest intellectual circles simply because the sheer entropic nature of all happenings is ignored or misunderstood. Sir Macfarlane Burnet, a Nobelite, in a special lecture considered it imperative "to prevent the progressive destruction of the earth's irreplaceable resources".[31]
And a prestigious institution such as the United Nations, in its Declaration on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972), repeatedly urged everyone "to improve the environment". Both urgings reflect the fallacy that man can reverse the march of entropy. The truth, however unpleasant, is that the most we can do is to prevent any unnecessary depletion of resources and any unnecessary deterioration of the environment, but without claiming that we know the precise meaning of "unnecessary" in this context.
The Steady State: A Topical Mirage
Malthus, as we know, was criticized primarily because he assumed that population and resources grow according to some simple mathematical laws. But this criticism did not touch the real error of Malthus (which has apparently remained unnoticed). This error is the implicit assumption that population may grow beyond any limit both in number and time provided that it does not grow too rapidly.[32] An essentially similar error has been committed by the authors of The Limits, by the authors of the non-mathematical yet more articulate "Blueprint for Survival", as well as by several earlier writers. Because, like Malthus, they were set exclusively on proving the impossibility of growth, they were easily deluded by a simple, now widespread, but false syllogism: since exponential growth in a finite world leads to disasters of all kinds, ecological salvation lies in the stationary state.[33] H Daly even claims that "the stationary state economy is, therefore, a necessity".[34]
This vision of a blissful world in which both population and capital stock remain constant, once expounded with his usual skill by John Stuart Mill,[35] was until recently in oblivion.[36] Because of the spectacular revival of this myth of ecological salvation, it is well to point out its various logical and factual snags. The crucial error consists in not seeing that not only growth, but also a zero-growth state, nay, even a declining state which does not converge toward annihilation, cannot exist forever in a finite environment. The error perhaps stems from some confusion between finite stock and finite flow rate, as the incongruous dimensionalities of several graphs suggest.[37] And contrary to what some advocates of the stationary state claim,[38] this state does not occupy a privileged position vis-a-vis physical laws.
To get to the core of the problem, let S denote the actual amount of accessible resources in the crust of the earth. Let Pi and si be the population and the amount of depleted resources per person in the year i. Let the "amount of total life", measured in years of life, be defined by [formula omitted], from i = 0 to i = 0o. S sets an upper limit for L through the obvious constraint [formula omitted]. For although si is a historical variable, it cannot be zero or even negligible (unless mankind reverts sometime to a berry-picking economy). Therefore, P = 0 for i greater than some finite n, and Pi > 0 otherwise. That value of n is the maximum duration of the human species.[39]
The earth also has a so-called carrying capacity, which depends on a complex of factors, including the size of si.[40] This capacity sets a limit on any single Pi. But this limit does not render the other limits, of L and n, superfluous. It is therefore inexact to argue – as the Meadows group seems to do[41] – that the stationary state can go on forever as long as Pi does not exceed that capacity. The proponents of salvation through the stationary state must admit that such a state can have only a finite duration – unless they are willing to join the "No Limit" Club by maintaining that S is inexhaustible or almost so – as the Meadows group does in fact.[42] Alternatively, they must explain the puzzle of how a whole economy, stationary for a long era, all of a sudden comes to an end.
Apparently, the advocates of the stationary state equate it with an open thermodynamic steady state. This state consists of an open macrosystem which maintains its entropic structure constant through material exchanges with its "environment". As one would immediately guess, the concept constitutes a highly useful tool for the study of biological organisms. We must, however, observe that the concept rests on some special conditions introduced by L Onsager.[43] These conditions are so delicate (they are called the principle of detailed balance) that in actuality they can hold only "within a deviation of a few percent".[44] For this reason, a steady state may exist in fact only in an approximated manner and over a finite duration. This impossibility of a macrosystem not in a state of chaos to be perpetually durable may one day be explicitly recognized by a new thermodynamic law just as the impossibility of perpetual motion once was. Specialists recognize that the present thermodynamic laws do not suffice to explain all nonreversible phenomena, including especially life processes.
Independently of these snags there are simple reasons against believing that mankind can live in a perpetual stationary state. The structure of such a state remains the same throughout; it does not contain in itself the seed of the inexorable death of all open macrosystems. On the other hand, a world with a stationary population would, on the contrary, be continually forced to change its technology as well as its mode of life in response to the inevitable decrease of resource accessibility. Even if we beg the issue of how capital may change qualitatively and still remain constant, we could have to assume that the unpredictable decrease in accessibility will be miraculously compensated by the right innovations at the right time. A stationary world may for a while be interlocked with the changing environment through a system of balancing feedbacks analogous to those of a living organism during one phase of its life. But as Bormann reminded us,[45] the miracle cannot last forever; sooner or later the balancing system will collapse. At that time, the stationary state will enter a crisis, which will defeat its alleged purpose and nature.
One must be cautioned against another logical pitfall, that of invoking the Prigogine principle in support of the stationary state. This principle states that the minimum of the entropy produced by an Onsager type of open thermodynamic system is reached when the system becomes steady.[46] It says nothing about how this last entropy compares with that produced by other open systems.[47]
The usual arguments adduced in favor of the stationary state are, however, of a different, more direct nature. It is, for example, argued that in such a state there is more time for pollution to be reduced by natural processes and for technology to adapt itself to the decrease of resource accessibility.[48] It is plainly true that we could use much more efficiently today the coal we have burned in the past. The rub is that we might not have mastered the present efficient techniques if we had not burned all that coal "inefficiently." The point that in a stationary state people will not have to work additionally to accumulate capital (which in view of what I have said in the last paragraphs is not quite accurate) is related to Mill's claim that people could devote more time to intellectual activities. "The trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heel" will cease.[49] History, however, offers multiple examples – the Middle Ages, for one – of quasi stationary societies where arts and sciences were practically stagnant. In a stationary state, too, people may be busy in the fields and shops all day long. Whatever the state, free time for intellectual progress depends on the intensity of the pressure of population on resources. Therein lies the main weakness of Mill's vision. Witness the fact that – as Daly explicitly admits[50] – its writ offers no basis for determining even in principle the optimum levels of population and capital. This brings to light the important, yet unnoticed point, that the necessary conclusion of the arguments in favor of that vision is that the most desirable state is not a stationary, but a declining one.
Undoubtedly, the current growth must cease, nay, be reversed. But anyone who believes that he can draw a blueprint for the ecological salvation of the human species does not understand the nature of evolution, or even of history – which is that of permanent struggle in continuously novel forms, not that of a predictable, controllable physico-chemical process, such as boiling an egg or launching a rocket to the moon.
Some Basic Bioeconomics[51]
Apart from a few insignificant exceptions, all species other than man use only endosomatic instruments – as Alfred Lotka proposed to call those instruments (legs, claws, wings, et cetera) which belong to the individual organism by birth. Man alone came, in time, to use a club, which does not belong to him by birth, but which extended his endosomatic arm and increased its power. At that point in time, man's evolution transcended the biological limits to include also (and primarily) the evolution of exosomatic instruments, that is, of instruments produced by man but not belonging to his body.[52] That is why man can now fly in the sky or swim under water even though his body has no wings, no fins, and no gills.
The exosomatic evolution brought down upon the human species two fundamental and irrevocable changes. The first is the irreducible social conflict which characterizes the human species.[53] Indeed, there are other species which also live in society, but which are free from such conflict. The reason is that their "social classes" correspond to some clear-cut biological divisions. The periodic killing of a great part of the drones by the bees is a natural, biological action, not a civil war.
The second change is man's addiction to exosomatic instruments – a phenomenon analogous to that of the flying fish which became addicted to the atmosphere and mutated into birds forever. It is because of this addiction that mankind's survival presents a problem entirely different from that of all other species.[54] It is neither only biological nor only economic. It is bioeconomic. Its broad contours depend on the multiple asymmetries existing among the three sources of low entropy which together constitute mankind's dowry – the free energy received from the sun, on the one hand, and the free energy and the ordered material structures stored in the bowels of the earth, on the other.
The first asymmetry concerns the fact that the terrestrial component is a stock, whereas the solar one is a flow. The difference needs to be well understood.[55] Coal in situ is a stock because we are free to use it all today (conceivably) or over centuries. But at no time can we use any part of a future flow of solar radiation. Moreover, the flow rate of this radiation is wholly beyond our control; it is completely determined by cosmological conditions, including the size of our globe.[56] One generation, whatever it may do, cannot alter the share of solar radiation of any future generation. Because of the priority of the present over the future and the irrevocability of entropic degradation, the opposite is true for the terrestrial shares. These shares are affected by how much of the terrestrial dowry the past generations have consumed.
Second, since no practical procedure is available at human scale for transforming energy into matter ... accessible material low entropy is by far the most critical element from the bioeconomic viewpoint. True, a piece of coal burned by our forefathers is gone forever, just as is part of the silver or iron, for instance, mined by them. Yet future generations will still have their inalienable share of solar energy (which, as we shall see next, is enormous). Hence, they will be able, at least, to use each year an amount of wood equivalent to the annual vegetable growth. For the silver and iron dissipated by the earlier generations there is no similar compensation. This is why in bioeconomics we must emphasize that every Cadillac or every Zim – let alone any instrument of war – means fewer plowshares for some future generations, and implicitly, fewer future human beings, too.[57]
Third, there is an astronomical difference between the amount of the flow of solar energy and the size of the stock of terrestrial free energy. At the cost of a decrease in mass of 131 x 1012 tons, the sun radiates annually 1013 Q – one single Q being equal to 1018 BTU! Of this fantastic flow, only some 5,300 Q are intercepted at the limits of the earth's atmosphere, with roughly one half of that amount being reflected back into outer space. At our own scale, however, even this amount is fantastic; for the total world consumption of energy currently amounts to no more than 0.2 Q annually. From the solar energy that reaches the ground level, photosynthesis absorbs only 1.2 Q. From waterfalls we could obtain at most 0.08 Q, but we are now using only one tenth of that potential. Think also of the additional fact that the sun will continue to shine with practically the same intensity for another five billion years (before becoming a red giant which will raise the earth's temperature to 1,000°F). Undoubtedly, the human species will not survive to benefit from all this abundance.
Passing to the terrestrial dowry, we find that, according to the best estimates, the initial dowry of fossil fuel amounted to only 215 Q. The outstanding recoverable reserves (known and probable) amount to about 200 Q. These reserves, therefore, could produce only two weeks of sunlight on the globe.[58] If their depletion continues to increase at the current pace, these reserves may support man's industrial activity for just a few more decades. Even the reserves of uranium 235 will not last for a longer period if used in the ordinary reactors. Hopes are now set on the breeder reactor, which, with the aid of uranium 235, may "extract" the energy of the fertile but not fissionable elements, uranium 238 and thorium 232. Some experts claim that this source of energy is "essentially inexhaustible".[59] In the United States alone, it is believed, there are large areas covered with black shale and granite which contain 60 grams of natural uranium or thorium per metric ton.[60] On this basis, Weinberg and Hammond[61] have come out with a grand plan. By strip mining and crushing all these rocks, we could obtain enough nuclear fuel for some 32,000 breeder reactors distributed in 4,000 offshore parks and capable of supplying a population of twenty billion for millions of years with twice as much energy per capita as the current consumption rate in the USA. The grand plan is a typical example of linear thinking, according to which all that is needed for the existence of a population, even "considerably larger than twenty billion", is to increase all supplies proportionally.[62] Not that the authors deny that there also are nontechnical issues; only, they play them down with noticeable zeal.[63] The most important issue, of whether a social organization compatible with the density of population and the nuclear manipulation at the grand level can be achieved, is brushed aside by Weinberg as "transscientific".[64] Technicians are prone to forget that due to their own successes, nowadays it may be easier to move the mountain to Mohammed than to induce Mohammed to go to the mountain. For the time being, the snag is far more palpable. As responsible forums openly admit, even one breeder still presents substantial risks of nuclear catastrophes, and the problem of safe transportation of nuclear fuels and especially that of safe storage of the radioactive garbage still await a solution even for a moderate scale of operations.[65]
There remains the physicist's greatest dream, controlled thermonuclear reaction. To constitute a real breakthrough, it must be the deuterium-deuterium reaction, the only one that could open up a formidable source of terrestrial energy for a long era.[66] However, because of the difficulties alluded to earlier ... even the experts working at it do not find reasons for being too hopeful.
For completion, we should also mention the tidal and geothermal energies, which, although not negligible (in all, 0.1 Q per year), can be harnessed only in very limited situations.
The general picture is now clear. The terrestrial energies on which we can rely effectively exist in very small amounts, whereas the use of those which exist in ampler amounts is surrounded by great risks and formidable technical obstacles. On the other hand, there is the immense energy from the sun which reaches us without fail. Its direct use is not yet practiced on a significant scale, the main reason being that the alternative industries are now much more efficient economically. But promising results are coming from various directions.[67] What counts from the bioeconomic viewpoint is that the feasibility of using the sun's energy directly is not surrounded by risks or big question marks; it is a proven fact.
The conclusion is that mankind's entropic dowry presents another important differential scarcity. From the viewpoint of the extreme long run, the terrestrial free energy is far scarcer than that received from the sun. The point exposes the foolishness of the victory cry that we can finally obtain protein from fossil fuels! Sane reason tells us to move in the opposite direction, to convert vegetable stuff into hydrocarbon fuel – an obviously natural line already pursued by several researchers.[68]
Fourth, from the viewpoint of industrial utilization, solar energy has an immense drawback in comparison with energy of terrestrial origin. The latter is available in a concentrated form; in some cases, in a too concentrated form. As a result, it enables us to obtain almost instantaneously enormous amounts of work, most of which could not even be obtained otherwise. By great contrast, the flow of solar energy comes to us with an extremely low intensity, like a very fine rain, almost a microscopic mist. The important difference from true rain is that this radiation rain is not collected naturally into streamlets, then into creeks and rivers, and finally into lakes from where we could use it in a concentrated form, as is the case with waterfalls. Imagine the difficulty one would face if one tried to use directly the kinetic energy of some microscopic rain drops as they fall. The same difficulty presents itself in using solar energy directly (that is, not through the chemical energy of green plants, or the kinetic energy of the wind and waterfalls). But as was emphasized a while ago, the difficulty does not amount to impossibility.[69]
Fifth, solar energy, on the other hand, has a unique and incommensurable advantage. The use of any terrestrial energy produces some noxious pollution, which, moreover, is irreducible and hence cumulative, be it in the form of thermal pollution alone. By contrast, any use of solar energy is pollution-free. For, whether this energy is used or not, its ultimate fate is the same, namely, to become the dissipated heat that maintains the thermodynamic equilibrium between the globe and outer space at a propitious temperature.[70]
The sixth asymmetry involves the elementary fact that the survival of every species on earth depends, directly or indirectly, on solar radiation (in addition to some elements of a superficial environmental layer). Man alone, because of his exosomatic addiction, depends on mineral resources as well. For the use of these resources man competes with no other species; yet his use of them usually endangers many forms of life, including his own. Some species have in fact been brought to the brink of extinction merely because of man's exosomatic needs or his craving for the extravagant. But nothing in nature compares in fierceness with man's competition for solar energy (in its primary or its by-product forms). Man has not deviated one bit from the law of the jungle; if anything, he has made it even more merciless by his sophisticated exosomatic instruments. Man has openly sought to exterminate any species that robs him of his food or feeds on him – wolves, rabbits, weeds, insects, microbes, et cetera.
But this struggle of man with other species for food (in ultimate analysis, for solar energy) has some unobtrusive aspects as well. And, curiously, it is one of these aspects that has some far-reaching consequences in addition to supplying a most instructive refutation of the common belief that every technological innovation constitutes a move in the right direction as concerns the economy of resources. The case pertains to the economy of modern agricultural techniques ...
Justus von Liebig observed that "civilization is the economy of power".[71] At the present hour, the economy of power in all its aspects calls for a turning point. Instead of continuing to be opportunistic in the highest degree and concentrating our research toward finding more economically efficient ways of tapping mineral energies – all in finite supply and all heavy pollutants – we should direct all our efforts toward improving the direct uses of solar energy – the only clean and essentially unlimited source. Already-known techniques should without delay be diffused among all people so that we all may learn from practice and develop the corresponding trade.
An economy based primarily on the flow of solar energy will also do away, though not completely, with the monopoly of the present over future generations, for even such an economy will still need to tap the terrestrial dowry, especially for materials. Technological innovations will certainly have a role in this direction. But it is high time for us to stop emphasizing exclusively – as all platforms have apparently done so far – the increase of supply. Demand can also play a role, an even greater and more efficient one in the ultimate analysis.
It would be foolish to propose a complete renunciation of the industrial comfort of the exosomatic evolution. Mankind will not return to the cave or, rather, to the tree. But there are a few points that may be included in a minimal bioeconomic program.
First, the production of all instruments of war, not only of war itself, should be prohibited completely. It is utterly absurd (and also hypocritical) to continue growing tobacco if, avowedly, no one intends to smoke. The nations which are so developed as to be the main producers of armaments should be able to reach a consensus over this prohibition without any difficulty if, as they claim, they also possess the wisdom to lead mankind. Discontinuing the production of all instruments of war will not only do away at least with the mass killings by ingenious weapons but will also release some tremendous productive forces for international aid without lowering the standard of living in the corresponding countries.
Second, through the use of these productive forces as well as by additional well-planned and sincerely intended measures, the underdeveloped nations must be aided to arrive as quickly as possible at a good (not luxurious) life. Both ends of the spectrum must effectively participate in the efforts required by this transformation and accept the necessity of a radical change in their polarized outlooks on life.[72]
Third, mankind should gradually lower its population to a level that could be adequately fed only by organic agriculture.[73] Naturally, the nations now experiencing a very high demographic growth will have to strive hard for the most rapid possible results in that direction.
Fourth, until either the direct use of solar energy becomes a general convenience or controlled fusion is achieved, all waste of energy – by overheating, overcooling, overspeeding, overlighting, et cetera – should be carefully avoided, and if necessary, strictly regulated.
Fifth, we must cure ourselves of the morbid craving for extravagant gadgetry, splendidly illustrated by such a contradictory item as the golf cart, and for such mammoth splendors as two-garage cars. Once we do so, manufacturers will have to stop manufacturing such "commodities".
Sixth, we must also get rid of fashion, of "that disease of the human mind", as Abbot Fernando Galliani characterized it in his celebrated Della Moneta (1750). It is indeed a disease of the mind to throw away a coat or a piece of furniture while it can still perform its specific service. To get a "new" car every year and to refashion the house every other is a bioeconomic crime. Other writers have already proposed that goods be manufactured in such a way as to be more durable.[74] But it is even more important that consumers should reeducate themselves to despise fashion. Manufacturers will then have to focus on durability.
Seventh, and closely related to the preceding point, is the necessity that durable goods be made still more durable by being designed so as to be repairable. (To put it in a plastic analogy, in many cases nowadays, we have to throw away a pair of shoes merely because one lace has broken.)
Eighth, in a compelling harmony with all the above thoughts we should cure ourselves of what I have been calling "the circumdrome of the shaving machine", which is to shave oneself faster so as to have more time to work on a machine that shaves faster so as to have more time to work on a machine that shaves still faster, and so on ad infinitum. This change will call for a great deal of recanting on the part of all those professions which have lured man into this empty infinite regress. We must come to realize that an important prerequisite for a good life is a substantial amount of leisure spent in an intelligent manner.
Considered on paper, in the abstract, the foregoing recommendations would on the whole seem reasonable to anyone willing to examine the logic on which they rest. But one thought has persisted in my mind ever since I became interested in the entropic nature of the economic process. Will mankind listen to any program that implies a constriction of its addiction to exosomatic comfort? Perhaps the destiny of man is to have a short but fiery, exciting, and extravagant life rather than a long, uneventful, and vegetative existence. Let other species – the amoebas, for example – which have no spiritual ambitions inherit an earth still bathed in plenty of sunshine.
Notes
References
This article was prepared for the U.S. Forest Service by Kim Winter of the Coevolution Institute. The images were made by Merlin D. Tuttle of Bat Conservation International.
During late spring in the Sonoran Desert, the white flowers of Saguaro (Carnegiea gigantea) cacti bloom for just one evening to attract Lesser Long-nosed Bats (Leptonycteris curasoae yerbabuena) and Mexican Long-tongued Bats (Choeronycteris mexicana) for pollination. The bats use their elongated muzzles to reach deep into Saguaro blossoms for nectar, covering their hairy heads with copious amounts of pollen that drop onto other flowers as the bats fly from cactus to cactus throughout the night. The blossoms close by the following afternoon, allowing daytime visitors such as wasps, bees, butterflies, and birds to pick up any remaining nectar or pollen left behind.
Lesser long-nosed bats are perfectly adapted to feed and pollinate Saguaros and other large Southwestern and Mexican succulents such as Organ-pipe Cactus (Stenocereus thurberi), agaves (Agave spp.) and Cardón (Pachycereus pringlei). Their narrow snouts easily detect the strong melon scent of the night-blooming flowers, and their brush-tipped tongues extend deeply into flowers to extract rich quantities of nectar and pollen produced by the cacti to ensure that pollinators will find them during their brief period of bloom.
Bat pollination of cacti and agaves helps maintain healthy desert ecosystems. Saguaros, the state flower of Arizona, are keystone species in the Sonoran Desert and grow up to 50 feet in height, providing important perching and nesting sites for Red-tailed Hawks (Buteo jamaicensis); and nesting cavities for Gilded Flickers (Colaptes chrysoides) and Gila Woodpeckers (Melanerpes uropygialis), Elf Owls (Micrathene whitneyi), Purple Martins (Progne subis), and other birds. Once the Saguaro fruit ripens in June, Lesser Long-nosed Bats, White-winged Doves (Zenaida asiatica), Gila Woodpeckers, and other birds consume the fleshy red pulp and thereby disperse the seeds, which pass through their guts intact. Agaves provide an important food resource to the Lesser Long-nosed Bat during its annual migration from Mexico to the Sonoran Desert.
The Lesser Long-nosed Bat is federally listed as endangered species by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. The survival of both bats and their desert food plants are threatened by loss of habitat due to development, invasive annual grasses, and changes in fire regimes. With nature in the balance, ensuring the future of the southwestern desert will depend on appreciating and protecting the roles played by both pollinator and plant in these fragile ecosystems.
Further Reading
In South America the savanna ecosystem covers a total of 269 million hectares (ha.) Most of it (76%) belongs to the Cerrados of Brazil but about 11% (28 million ha) form the Venezuelan Llanos and 6% (16-17 million ha) the "Llanos Orientales" of Colombia. These two areas, although belonging to different countries, form a single ecoregion, the Llanos of the Orinoquia (latitude 3° to 10° N and longitude 62° to 74° W). This is an area of extensive plains, covered mainly by savanna vegetation, of great economic importance for both countries. This ecoregion is relatively young, perhaps less than 10,000 years old, and developed in a great geosyncline between the Guiana Plateau and the Andes Range. This extensive basin was, over time, filled with sediments from the Guiana Plateau and the cordilleras during the Tertiary. The ecoregion then experienced a series of subsidences resulting in a landscape made up mainly of alluvial plains and highlands.
The llanos ecoregion covers a large elongated area 1,200-1,300 kilometers (km) long, that extends in a gentle curve in a northeast direction, beginning at the foothills of the Oriental Andes of Colombia and extending along the course of the Orinoco River almost to its delta at the sea. The Llanos ecoregion is located in a great depression, limited by the Andes in the west, the Venezuelan coastal range that isolates it from the Caribbean Sea in the north, and the Guiana shield in the south. In Colombia they occupy the departments of Meta, Arauca, Vichada, and Casanare, and continue in Venezuela in the states of Apure, Barinas, Portuguesa, Cojedes, Guarico, Anzoategui, and Monagas. The area of the lowlands of Colombia and Apure State collects the rainfall from the Andes and the Guiana plateau and draining, due to the presence of a slight downward slope in the north-east direction, through the Meta, Arauca, Vichada, Cinaruco, Apure, and Capanaparo Rivers, just to name a few, to the Orinoco River.
Throughout this long course the llanos ecoregion exhibits a high heterogeneity in landscapes and types of vegetation. Huber and Alarcón divide the Venezuelan llanos into seven areas, that listed from southwest to northeast are; a) the occidental llanos, b) the Apure llanos, c) the low Central llanos, d) the high Central llanos, e) the Unare depression, f) the oriental "mesas" and g) the oriental llanos of Monagas. For the Colombian part of the llanos ecoregion several classifications have been proposed. Rippstein et al. recognize three types of landscape: the foothills, the alluvial plains and the highlands, that may be divided in well-drained highplains and floodable highplains. Etter defines seven different zones; a) the highplains, b) very dissected highplains, c) the sandy Guiana highplains, d) foothill non-flooded savannas, e) bushy savannas on "medanos", f) flooded savannas of the eolic plains, g) patches of flooded savannas and forests on the overflow plains. These classifications give an idea of the high complexity of the area, given that each of these zones has a specific vegetation, soils, topographic position and hydric regime.
Although there is some change in the climate as we move from the Colombian part of the ecoregion with altitudes between 600-200 meters (m), to the Venezuelan areas at less than 100 m. This ecoregion has a typical savanna climate, with a well-defined wet and dry season and high temperature all year round. According to PDVSA the climate of this area falls in the types Awi (savannas and semi-dry tropophilus forests), Awi (savannas and semi-humid tropophilus forests) and Awi (savannas and humid tropophilus forests) according to Koeppen's classification. Total annual rainfall changes significantly as we move through the ecoregion from the higher west-south with 2,500 millimeters (mm) per year, to the center of the basin with 1,200-1,600 mm per year in the Apure, and 800-1,200 mm in the north-east end in the Llanos of Monagas State. There is a definite rainy season in the middle of the year that may last as long as 10 months in the south-west and seven months in the north-east. As much as 95% of all annual precipitation falls between April and November, with over 400 mm of monthly rainfall during June-July. An intense drought, 3 to 5 months long, occurs between December and April, with less than 50 mm of monthly rainfall. This pattern causes some areas to flood during the rainy season and become completely dry during the drought. Temperature also varies along the llanos ecoregion being higher in the northeast. On average, the mean annual temperature is 27°C, with minima in June, July, December and January, and maxima in March and April, but the differences between the coldest and hottest months are very small (2°C). In contrast, daily differences range from 13 to 17°C.
Dominant soils in the area belong mainly to the orders ultisols and oxisols, but with a great diversity of types according mainly to their topographic position. Analysis of texture indicates that in the llanos ecoregion north of the Orinoco River soils are mostly of a group of sandy-clay soils. The high llanos soils have a higher proportion of sand than the lowlands, with very low fertility due to leaching, acid (pH between 4.5 and 5.5), low organic matter content, C/N relation between 15 and 20, low CIC, high levels of Fe and Al, and deficiency of P and Ca. A cemented hardpan or plinthite of iron concretions is present in many areas near the surface of the soil, affecting water percolation and making difficult the establishment of trees. In the seasonally flooded lowland savannas, soils are somewhat richer, with a higher proportion of silt and organic matter and higher fertility. Tejos et al. gives a good description of the soils of this periodically flooded system and its potential use. In these areas, the organic matter production is much higher than in the highlands. The soils of the several types of forests found in the area differ among them and with the savannas. For a more detailed description of the rich variety of soils in the llanos and their relationship with the topography and vegetation types see Berroterán, Rippstein et al., Blydenstein, Sarmiento, Zinck, Ramia, Garcia Miragaya et al., Medina and Silva, Tejos et al. and Stergios et al..
According to Holdridge's classification, a deciduous dry tropical forest should cover the llanos. The dominant vegetation type in this ecoregion; however, is savanna creating a contradiction that has not yet been satisfactorily explained. In fact, the llanos are a very floristically heterogeneous ecoregion. Huber and Alarcón recognize 29 different types of vegetation for the Venezuelan llanos, including ten different types of savannas, 9 types of forests. Blydenstein, Rangel et al. and Rippstein et al. describe a similar degree of complexity for the Colombian llanos. Below, we will try to give a short description of the more important vegetation types, although the fact that the scientists working in Colombia and Venezuela haven't homogenized the nomenclature makes difficult their comparison between both countries.
The ten different types of Venezuelan savannas described by Huber and Alarcón differ from one another in: a) the topographic position, that separates them in "llanos altos" or high llanos, that never get flooded, and the "llanos bajos" or lowlands that get flooded during the rainy season; b) the presence or absence of trees and bushes; and c) the floristic composition of the herbaceous layer. However, it should be emphasized that these three factors are interdependent; each type of vegetation appears in a specific topographic position and is usually associated to a certain type of soil. About 65% of the Venezuelan savannas, a total of 28 million ha, in the Orinoquia are the Trachypogon species savannas. These are a somewhat floristically heterogeneous group of savannas, whose main common characteristic is the dominance of this grass species genus, however it has been subdivided by Blydenstein (for Colombia) and other authors (for Venezuela), into several sub-types. These are non-flooded savannas, that grow mainly on the "llanos altos" or highplains, over poor soils with very low nutrient content, many times with a lateritic hardpan layer near or at the surface of the soil. The herbaceous layer has a height of 30-100 centimeters (cm) and the tussocks are separated by a distance of 10 to 30 cm. San José and Montes reported a total of 285 species of angiosperms belonging to 55 families for these savannas. In a typical Trachypogon spp. savanna characteristic species are Trachypogon plumosus, T. vestitus, Axonopus canescens, A. anceps, Andropogon selloanus, several species of the genus Aristida, Leptocoryphium lanatum, Paspalum carinatum, Sporobolus indicus, S. cubensis, sedges of the genera Rhynchospora and Bulbostylis, and a good variety of legumes of the genera Mimosa, Cassia, Desmodium, Eriosema, Galactia, Indigofera, Phaseolus, Stylosanthes, Tephrosia, and Zornia. Scattered trees belonging mostly to two species, the "manteco" (Byrsonima crassifolia) and the "chaparro" (Curatella americana) occur rather frequently, as does the "alcornoque" (Bodwichia virgilioides). Groups of trees, usually called "matas", are common, with sizes that vary between less than 12 m in diameter to one ha or more. They are considered remnants of the deciduous dry forest that covered much larger areas some years ago, but humans are rapidly destroying these. Several subtypes of this Trachypogon species savanna occur and differ in their floristic composition. These savannas have been used traditionally for extensive cattle raising, but their grasses are of poor quality and productivity is low.
The other two Ramia's types are seasonally flooded savannas, which support some level of inundation for a few to several months a year. They comprise the Paspalum fasciculatum savannas and the savannas of "banco, bajio and estero". The Paspalum fasciculatum savannas, locally called "gamelotales", are almost monospecific communities, that support over two meters of water at peak rainfall, grow over much better soils than the Trachypogon savannas, have high productivity (up to 25 tonnes/ha) and provide good pastures during the drought. They comprise about 15% of all Venezuelan savannas. The second important type of flooded savanna are the "banco, bajio, and estero" savannas that, in Venezuela, represent about 20% of the llanos. These savannas derive their name from the topography of the place were they grow, a series of gentle slopes with scarcely two meters level difference between its upper and lower parts. The "banco" is the higher area, originally the bank of a former river that has a changed course. The bancos are elongated areas, with sandy soils and many of them keep remnants of their former vegetation, from the gallery forest. They have a rich flora dominated by grasses; occupy 60-80% of these savannas and are flooded with 5-20 cm of water at peak rainfall. They have a mixture of C3 and C4 grasses. Finally the "esteros" occupy the lower part of these savannas, where water accumulates during the rainy season reaching 50-80 cm depth. They are covered by C3 hydrophilus grasses. Two special cases of flooded savannas that cover comparatively small areas are the so called by Huber and Alarcón open flooded savannas ("Estero de Camaguan"), flooded during most of the year with 30-100 cm of water and characterized by the presence of the palm Copernicia tectorum; and the "congriales" or bushy flooded savannas of the Orinoco vegas.
For Colombia, Blydenstein proposed a more detailed floristic classification of savannas that includes the following types; a) the Melinis minutiflora savannas (an introduced African grass), b) the Trachypogon ligularis-Paspalum carinatum savannas; c) the Paspalum carinatum savanna; d) the Trachypogon vestitus savanna; e) The Paspalum pectinatum savanna; f) the T. vestitus-Axonopus purpusii savanna; g) the T. ligularis savanna; h) the Leptocoryphium lanatum savanna; i) the Mesosetum savanna and j) the Andropogon savanna. Many of them are sub-types of the Trachypogon spp. savanna sensu Ramia.
Besides these savanna areas, the llanos have a wide variety of forests. The most important of these are: a) gallery forests of various types that follow the courses of the streams and rivers. In some cases the rivers overflow their banks limiting the gallery forest so it coincides with the extent of the flooding, behaving as a seasonal swamp forest. A special case is the "morichales" characterized by the presence of the palm Mauritia flexuosa, and the Orinoco "vegas", evergreen forests of 8 to 20 m high whose more common species are Inga spp., Combretum frangulifolium, Gustavia augusta, Pterocarpus sp., Etaballia dubia, Spondias mombin, Copaifera pubiflora, etc. In other cases the forest occurs on the higher banks where they avoid flooding and most trees are semideciduous, of medium height (12-15 m), with a well-developed understory. A recent description of the floristic composition and diversity of these gallery forests may be found in Stergios et al.; b) deciduous dry forests probably covered most of the northern part of the central high Venezuelan llanos, but have been reduced to isolated patches or even very small "matas". These are deciduous woods 8-15 m high, very dense, with well developed understories of semi-deciduous shrub stratum. Although their floristic composition varies, frequent species are Tabebuia billbergii, Godmania aesculifolia, Cassia moschata, Spondias mombin, Copaifera pubiflora, Bourreria cumanensis, several species of Cordia, Bursera simaruba, Cochlospermum vitifolium, Hura crepitans, Acacia glomerosa, etc. The c) "matorrales" or bushlands are 5-8 m high, deciduous and semideciduous, and is most likely secondary vegetation that developed in zones formerly occupied by deciduous dry forest. They now cover extensive areas in the north of the Venezuelan central llanos. Characteristic species are Bourreria cumanensis, Randia aculeata, Godmania aesculifolia, Pereskia guamacho, Prosopis spp., Xylosma benthamii, Erytroxylum sp. and Cereus hexagonus. For the Colombian llanos, Rangel et al. reported 2,126 species of plants belonging to 807 genera and 180 families. The highest diversity corresponds to the Rubiaceae with over seven hundred species, the Leguminosae (255), Poaceae (214) and Cyperaceae (96). Geographically, the highest diversity is found in the highplains area of the ecoregion with over 1,500 species.
The llanos ecoregion has less biotic diversity and fewer endemic species than the adjacent ecoregions; most biodiversity is found in the forests. There is a small number of endemic plant species in the llanos. For the savannas, Huber & Alarcon list Vernonia aristeguietae, Bourreria aristeguietana, Stilpnopappus pittieri, S. apurensis, Hymenocallis venezuelensis, Eriocaulon rubescens, Limnosipanea ternifolia; for the gallery forests, Gustavia acuta. The open savannas are the least used habitat by the megafauna of this ecoregion, and most of the faunistic richness is concentrated around permanent and temporary water sources.
There are 102 species of mammals in the Venezuelan llanos; about 31% of the terrestrial mammal fauna of Venezuela. Most of them are 59 Chiroptera, but there are also 17 Rodentia, 11 Carnivora, 5 Edentada, 4 Marsupialia, 2 Primates, 2 Artiodactyla, 1 Perissodactyla, and 1 Lagomorpha. The mammalian fauna of neotropical savannas is rather poor, considering their geographical extent. A surprising characteristic of the llanos fauna is the almost complete absence of native ungulates, especially in comparison with the African savannas. Almost all African ungulates are specialized for the savanna ecosystem, whereas in the Orinoquia savannas only the white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) is found, and even this species reaches its highest densities in the gallery forest and the savanna-forest ecotone. In the wet and flooded savannas, the large herbivore ecological niche is occupied by the largest existing rodent, the capybara (Hydrochoerus hydrochaeris), that reaches weights over 50 kilograms (kg). Besides this species, the mammals more commonly found in the open savannas are the savanna rabbit (Sylvilagus floridanus), and several species of rodents like Sigmodon alstoni, S. hispidus, Zygondotomys brevicauda, and Orizomys bicolor. In the gallery forest a much greater diversity of large and medium-size mammals: pecaríes (Tayassu tajacu and T. pecari), tapirs (Tapirus terrestris), deer (Odocoileus virginianus, Mazama americana), monkeys (Cebus nigrivittatus, Alouatta seniculus), large rodents (Agouti paca, Dasyprocta spp., Coendou prehensilis), and several felides like pumas (Puma concolor), jaguars (Panthera onca), and ocelots (Leopardus pardalis).
Colombia has the richest avifauna of any country in the world (more than 1700 bird species), but less than 40% of them are found at the Colombian llanos. Roughly, at least half of the 1,313 bird species recorded in Venezuela include the llanos in their distribution. Over one hundred of the birds reported for the Orinoquia are migratory birds that winter in the llanos. Most of the birds of the llanos inhabit and are usually restricted to the gallery forest. In contrast, habitat specialization is rare in savanna birds, and many of them are able to proliferate in agricultural areas as is the case of almost all seed-eater birds (pigeons, doves, finches, sparrows, crested bobwhite). Wading and aquatic birds represent a large portion of the total bird fauna in the flooded savannas. They are one of the major tourist attractions in the ecoregion, given many of them are large colorful birds that form large aggregations around water sources.
A fairly large number of herpetological fauna exisits in this ecoregion; mainly in the forests and the "bancos, bajíos, and esteros" savannas, but is comparatively poor in Trachypogon savannas. A total of 36 amphibians and 75 reptiles have been reported for the Venezuelan llanos, whereas 28 amphibians and 119 reptiles are included in the list of species for the Colombian llanos. Some reptile species deserve mention: Arrau sideneck or Orinoco turtle (Podocnemis expansa), the largest american fluvial turtle, reaching weights of over 50 kg; the Orinoco crocodile (Crocodylus intermedius) which is the only species of crocodile restricted to a single river basin, and the red-footed tortoise (Geochelone carbonaria) which is the wild species more frequently used as food for rural populations in the area.
Some 300 fish species have been reported for the Venezuelan llanos. The aquatic fauna greatly increases, both in abundance and in number of species, during the rainy season when there is a substantial expansion of the area covered by water and changes in the level of some rivers that may reach 8 m. In contrast, during the drought, only some fishes with respiratory adaptations to breath atmospheric oxygen can survive outside the rivers given that the high temperature (30-40°C) and poor water circulation cause a drastic reduction in the amount of oxygen in the water.
The number of endemic vertebrates is even lower. There are no endemic birds restricted to the llanos ecoregion, and only two mammals: the marsupial Monodelphis orinoci and the edentate Dasypus sabanicola. Herpetological endemism in the llanos is very low in comparison with adjacent ecoregions. One of them is the Orinoco crocodile (Crocodylus intermedius) one of the most world's endangered crocodilians.
Contrary to what happens in the south of South America, no mammals were intentionally introduced in the Orinoquia, except domestic animals. However, the cosmopolitan rodents Mus musculus and Rattus rattus are an important plague in cereal crops. The most relevant example of the introduction of a fish in the Venezuelan llanos is the "mojarra" (Caquetaia kraussii), a native species to other parts of Venezuela that was introduced in the flooded savannas and is now a dominant species in the area.
According to the red book of the Venezuelan fauna and the apendix III of CITES for Colombia, the following species that inhabit the llanos are at risk of extinction: the giant armadillo (Priodontes maximus) virtually extinct north of the Orinoco; the giant river otter (Pteronura brasiliensis), a species that till the sixties was common in the Orinoco River and its tributaries, but today is one of the most endangered otter species of Latin America; the ocelot (Leopardus pardalis) that although severely affected in the llanos persists in the forests south of the Orinoco river; the jaguar (Pantera onca), the largest american felidae which has been severely hunted in the llanos both for sport and because ocassionally may attack cattle; the tapir (Tapirus terrestris), very abundant in the past but now drastically reduced to some scattered areas; the manati (Trichechus manatus), still abundant in some areas of the high Orinoco, but intensively hunted; the Arrau sideneck (Podocnemis expansa) whose populations have fallen to alarmant levels in spite of the efforts made for its protection; and finally, the Orinoco crocodile (Crocodylus intermedius), considered in critical risk of extinction, but fortunately, several captive-breeding stations have been established which released over 1,500 animals during the last decade. In contrast, there are no birds in serious risk of extinction in the llanos. Bird species of the area listed as vulnerable are: sharp-tailed ibis (Cerbibis oxycerca) whose distribution is restricted to the llanos and is the most scarce ibis species found in Colombia and Venezuela; and the scarlet macaw (Ara macao), the macaw most used as a pet.
Seventy one percent of the South American savannas have been converted to croplands and 5% are now urban areas. Most of this devastating transition took place in the Brazilian Cerrados during the last forty years, but the modification of the Orinoquia has been significant and will continue to increase in the future because this ecoregion is the center of agricultural production, and more recently, of oil production for both countries.
A total of 1.2 million ha are protected in the Colombian Orinoquia as National Parks of "Cordillera de Los Picachos", "El Tuparro" and "Tinigua". In the Venezuelan llanos also 1.2 million ha are protected in the National Parks of "Aguaro-Guariquito" in the high llanos, "Cinaruco-Caparo" in the lowlands of Apure State, and "Río Viejo". Besides, there are four fauna refugies: "Tortuga Arrau", "Caño Guaritico", "Estero de Chiriguare", and "Morichal Largo".
The llanos ecoregion is being affected by several transformations; below we list the most important: (a) Agriculture: Cattle raising is by far the main activity in the ecoregion and it is responsible of many changes in the area. There are 15 million head of cattle in the ecoregion. Given the low quality of the native grasses, fire is used regularly to increase their quality, the forests are cleared to increase pasture lands and natural savannas are being replaced by introduced pastures. There are 1.3 million ha being used as introduced pastures in the Colombian llanos, and about 4 million in its Venezuelan counterpart. Besides, a rapidly increasing area is being cultivated with different crops, especially corn and rice. The 200,000 ha dedicated to the rice crops in the western Venezuelan llanos attract huge flocks of migrant birds like the whistling ducks (Dendrocygna viduata, D. autumnalis, and D. bicolor) and the dickcissel (Spiza americana). These birds cause serious damage to the crops that in some cases may reach 100% of the harvest because of this the ranch owners kill these birds in large numbers. Dickcissel is now considered an endangered species due to the rapid decrease in its population numbers caused in part by this massive annihilation in the rice crops of Venezuela.
(b) Deforestation and farming for the wood industry: The Venezuelan llanos have the highest deforestation rate in the country. Between 1950 and 1975, 1.3 million ha were deforested in the western Venezuelan llanos; from this date to present the average deforestation rate in all Venezuelan llanos has been 34,000 ha/year. A similar situation occurs in the foothills of the Colombian Orinoquia where deforestation reached figures of 4.4% between 1979 and 1988. In contrast, half a million ha of savannas in the llanos of Monagas have been transformed to Pinus caribeae plantations during the last 30 years, and about 100,000 ha more will be sowed at Guarico State in the next years. The pines completely eliminate the original savanna vegetation, a fact that greatly affects the fauna of the area. In places were the pines were harvested, there is some indication that a comparatively fast recovery of the savanna takes place, but a minimum of 20 years seems neccessary to achieve a near natural condition.
(c) Oil industry: Almost 3 million ha of Venezuelan llanos has been affected by the oil industry. This is also one of the main threats in the Colombian Orinoquia, because it may produce a wide spectrum of disturbances, such as deforestation, habitat fragmentation by roads, increment in human settlements, as well as air and water contamination.
(d) Dikes and ponds: The llanos ecoregion is also the most affected by the construction of dikes in Venezuela. All over the ecoregion there are thousands of small permanent ponds made by the land owners to provide water to their livestock during the drought, which also benefits wildlife. In the "banco, bajío, and estero" savannas, an area of 190,000 ha has been covered by a network of low dikes, the so-called "Modulos de Apure", whose purpose is to control flooding during the rainy season and save water for the cattle during the drought. This transformation completely altered the hydrologic flood/drought cycle of these savannas, artificially increasing the level of flooding and almost eliminating drought. These changes greatly impact the vegetation reducing its diversity by half, but it benefited the livestock, as well as the aquatic and wetland fauna.
There are four African grasses that behave as very agressive invaders in Venezuelan savannas. These are Melinis minutiflora, very successful in savannas above 600 meters above sea level and rather abundant in Colombia; Hyparrenia rufa, in lowland savannas with poor soils and marked dry season; Panicum maximum, in humid and relatively fertile areas, and Brachiaria mutica in periodically flooded savannas. All these species generally occur on the wetter (but not inundable) and/or more fertile habitats of the savanna, and are consequently favored by the fertilizers used for the agriculture.
These vast savanna shrublands dominate the northern Orinoco River Watershed, and form the transitional zone from the xeric habitats to the north, and the moist forests to the south. This is a nationally and internationally recognized ecoregion and our linework follows the classifications of Huber & Alarcon. From their map we lumped many of their fine scale delineations (subregion B.2 llanos) to meet our broader classification, including: "high central llanos", "low central llanos", "southwestern llanos (Apure llanos)", "eastern mesas", "eastern llanos", and portions of "western llanos". Southern portions of the "western llanos" classification were lumped into dry forest ecoregions for their dry climate and unique species associations.
The South Asian region (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) is notable for its large and rapidly growing population (more than one-fifth of the world total). Despite rapid economic growth during the 1990s, the nations in the region have among the lowest per capita incomes in the world. India is by far the largest South Asian country in terms of population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and land area, followed by Pakistan and Bangladesh. In 2005, India had an estimated growth rate in real GDP of 7.2 percent, while Pakistan and Bangladesh had estimated growth rates of 8.4 percent and 5.4 percent, respectively. India’s GDP is projected to grow 6.8 percent in 2006, with Pakistan’s growth at 6.4 percent and Bangladesh’s growth at 5.1 percent.
South Asia is in a period of transition as it strives to implement effective economic, political, social, and legal structures to support sustained growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have arranged several billion dollars in assistance to the region. The IMF has prescribed such measures as cuts in subsidies (especially energy subsidies), deregulation, anti-poverty efforts, and increased privatization in the near future.
Energy Overview
Economic and population growth in South Asia have resulted in rapid increases in energy consumption in recent years, well above rates seen in the OECD. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates of South Asia’s primary energy consumption showed an increase of 52 percent between 1993 and 2003 (EIA energy statistics include only “commercial” energy sources and not animal waste, wood, or other biomass, which accounts for more than half of South Asia’s total final energy consumption). In 2003, South Asia accounted for approximately 4.0 percent of world commercial energy consumption, up from 3.1 percent in 1993. Despite this growth in energy demand, however, South Asia continues to average among the lowest levels of per capita energy consumption in the world, but among the highest levels of energy consumption per unit of GDP.
Discounting “non-commercial” sources of energy including animal waste, wood, and other biomass, South Asia's commercial energy mix in 2003 was 44 percent coal, 35 percent petroleum, 13 percent natural gas, 6 percent hydroelectricity, 1 percent nuclear and 0.3 percent “other.” There are significant variations within the region. Bangladesh’s energy mix, for example, is dominated by natural gas (67 percent in 2003), while India relies heavily on coal (52 percent in 2003). Sri Lanka and the Maldives are overwhelmingly dependent on petroleum (84 percent and 100 percent, respectively); Pakistan is diversified among petroleum (38 percent), natural gas (41 percent), and hydroelectricity (14 percent). The Himalayan countries of Bhutan and Nepal have the highest shares of hydroelectric power in their energy consumption mix at 82 percent and 37 percent, respectively, in 2003. South Asian nations are faced with rapidly rising energy demand coupled with increasingly insufficient energy supplies. Most of South Asia is already grappling with energy shortfalls, typically in the form of recurrent, costly, and widespread electricity outages. Because of the economic and political ramifications arising from such shortfalls, improving the supply of energy, particularly the supply of electricity, is an important priority of national and local governments. The countries of South Asia are looking to diversify their traditional energy supplies, promote additional foreign investment for energy infrastructure development, improve energy efficiency, reform and privatize energy sectors, and promote and expand regional energy trade and investment.
Another implication of rising energy demand in South Asia is its impact on the region’s level of carbon dioxide emissions. As of 2003, South Asia accounted for 4.7 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions. With the demand for coal in India projected to increase rapidly in the coming years (from 431 million short tons (Mmst) in 2003 to 544 million short tons (Mmst) in 2010) and the recent introduction of coal into the fuel mix of other countries in the region, a significant increase in emissions in the future is expected.
South Asia contains reserves of only 6.2 billion barrels of oil, around 0.5 percent of world reserves. In 2005, South Asia consumed around 3.09 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil, and produced approximately 0.93 million bbl/d, making the region a net oil importer of around 2.2 million bbl/d. The vast majority (around 858,000 bbl/d in 2005) of South Asia’s oil production comes from India, whose offshore Bombay High field accounts for approximately one-third of total Indian oil output. Most of the remainder of South Asia’s oil production comes from Pakistan (around 62,000 bbl/d in 2005). South Asia’s oil imports are projected to more than double by 2020. The Middle East is the primary source of South Asian oil imports. In an effort to reduce oil import dependence, a number of South Asian countries have sought to expand domestic petroleum exploration by attracting private and foreign investors. In July 2003, the Sri Lankan government approved the Petroleum Resources Act to allow for private and foreign investment in its offshore oil and gas fields. Similarly, Pakistan recently executed Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) with exploration companies based in France, Malaysia and Austria. India is making attempts to better implement its 1997 New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) to increase foreign involvement in exploration, such as by awarding 15 exploration blocks in February 2004.
Growing demand for transportation fuels and industrial power has been a major factor behind the growth in South Asian oil consumption. Between 1990 and 2005, South Asian oil consumption -- led by India -- grew by about 111 percent. India’s oil consumption is forecast to grow another 10 percent by 2010, reaching 2.8 million bbl/d (up from 2.5 million bbl/d in 2005). In Sri Lanka, where oil is the dominant source of energy, oil consumption more than doubled between 1990 and 2005. In 2005, Sri Lanka’s oil consumption was 87,000 bbl/d. Sri Lanka imports all of its crude oil and uses it largely for electricity generation and transportation. The country has a refining capacity of 50,000 bbl/d. In recent years, Sri Lanka has further increased oil imports in an effort to avoid over-reliance on hydroelectricity.
Several oil finds in India may reduce import dependence in South Asia. In September 2004, UK oil firm Cairn Energy confirmed the potential of its Mangala field in western Rajasthan at between 100 and 320 million barrels. Its nearby N-A field has an estimated recoverable reserve of 80 million barrels. This field is expected to yield 60,000 to 100,000 bbl/d by 2008.
Refining and Transportation
In the face of growing oil demand, several South Asian countries have responded with plans to expand their refining and transportation capacities. Since 1998, India's total refining capacity has increased by 100 percent to 2.3 million bbl/d as of January 2006. India’s Reliance Industries refinery at Jamnagar began operation in late summer 1999 and has a capacity of 540,000 bbl/d. Jamnagar is the only privately owned refinery in India. In 2005, Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. (BPCL) completed the expansion of its Mumbai refinery from 180,000 bbl/d to 240,000 bbl/d, making it the second largest refinery in India after the Jamnagar facility. Petronet India is in the process of building product pipelines that will add approximately 500,000 bbl/d to the existing 325,000 bbl/d of pipeline capacity, thereby displacing rail as the main mode of transportation for petroleum products.
In Pakistan, the 100,000-bbl/d “Pak-Arab” refinery came online in late 2000, helping to alleviate the country’s dependence on refined product imports. Two additional refinery projects have been proposed. One is a private venture near Karachi. The second is an “Iran-Pak” partnership project near the border with Iran, which has had difficulty in securing funding. If constructed, the two refineries would add an estimated 160,000 bbl/d to Pakistan’s refining capacity.
In January 2006, South Asia’s proven natural gas reserves were estimated at 62.1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), approximately 1 percent of the world total, with potentially larger resources suspected but unproven. India’s and Pakistan’s reserves are 38.9 Tcf and 28.2 Tcf, respectively, while the only other South Asian country with reserves, Bangladesh, contains approximately 5.0 Tcf. Foreign energy companies including Shell and Unocal believe that Bangladeshi reserves may be higher than the official figure. The US Geological Survey estimates that Bangladesh contains 32.1 Tcf in additional “undiscovered reserves.” If the higher estimates prove to be correct, Bangladesh could become a major gas producer and supplier to the potential market in neighboring India. Unocal announced in March 2004 the end to a proposal for exports of natural gas to India, citing political reasons.
At present, all natural gas production in South Asia is consumed domestically. Natural gas is seen as playing an important part in supplying new power plants in the region and diversifying from expensive oil imports. As a result, natural gas usage has increased rapidly in South Asia over the last decade, growing about 67 percent between 1993 and 2003. In 2003, the region produced and consumed around 2.2 Tcf of natural gas. Around 43 percent was consumed by India, 38 percent by Pakistan, and the remaining 19 percent by Bangladesh.
Indian consumption of natural gas has risen faster than that of any other fuel in recent years and accounts for approximately 7.0 percent of the country’s energy demand. At nearly 1.0 Tcf in 2003, Indian gas demand is projected to significantly and rapidly increase, reaching 2.5 Tcf in 2025.
Increased use of natural gas in power generation will account for much of the change. Like India, Pakistan plans to increase the use of natural gas for future electric power generation projects, a move that will necessitate a sharp rise in production and/or imports of natural gas. Because natural gas is already Bangladesh’s primary source of commercial energy, gas exports are a controversial topic within Bangladesh, as many people feel that Bangladeshi gas resources should be used for domestic purposes before exporting.
If long-term projections of rapidly increasing gas demand for South Asia are correct, the region will require significant increases in production and/or imports. Even with expanded production, however, increased consumption of natural gas in South Asia is constrained by the region's inadequate domestic infrastructure. Gas imports would require construction of infrastructure -- either cross-border pipelines or liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities -- and their success would likewise hinge on the successful construction of domestic gas pipeline infrastructure. A number of such infrastructure projects have been proposed in India and Pakistan.
Although India’s Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) approved 12 prospective LNG import terminal projects, several were delayed or canceled in 2001 following the government’s decision not to extend payment guarantees to power projects which were to have been the largest LNG consumers. An import terminal at Dahej received India's first cargo of LNG in January 2004. Construction on LNG projects in Gujarat and Kerala has proceeded, with completion dates extending through 2007. The nearly complete Dabhol LNG plant was delayed due to a cancellation of the second stage of the Dabhol Power Project and financial concerns. In November 2004, Shell began operation of an LNG terminal at Hazira, which is estimated to cost $660 million to build. The LNG facility is owned 74 percent by Shell Hazira and 26 percent by Total of France. Several other LNG terminals are in planning stages. A recent natural gas find in Burma is also seen as a potential source of supply for India. Bangladeshi officials stated in June 2004 a willingness to consider a pipeline running across Bangladesh from Burma to West Bengal in India.
Pakistan expects its discoveries, including one in January 2004, to add about 1 billion cubic feet per day (Bcfd) to its natural gas production. In mid-2000 and again in 2001, Pakistan’s government stated that it would permit a gas pipeline linking Iranian gas reserves to rival India to cross its territory. Pakistan would earn transit fees for Iranian gas supplied to India and be able to purchase gas from the pipeline itself. While Iran and Pakistan have shown great interest in the project, India has been reluctant to move forward due to continuing political and military tensions with Pakistan. The recent improvement in India-Pakistan relations over the past few years has increased interest in the plan.
Pakistan may also be linked into the Dolphin Project, a scheme to supply gas from Qatar's North Dome gas field to the United Arab Emirates and Oman via a subsea link. Although Pakistan has signed an agreement to eventually purchase gas from Qatar, it seems unlikely that Pakistan will be included in the project in the near-term due to financial weakness and uncertainty about sufficient demand growth. A third possible gas pipeline would link gas-rich Turkmenistan with Dalautabad in central Pakistan via Afghanistan and continue into India. Although the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan have reached an agreement to develop the pipeline, financial and security challenges are likely to prevent its development. Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka do not currently produce or consume any natural gas.
South Asia contains coal reserves of 105.3 billion short tons or approximately 11 percent of the world total. Although coal accounts for 44 percent of South Asia’s energy consumption, nearly all of the coal in this region is produced and consumed by India, the only South Asian country with significant coal reserves (102 billion short tons) and the world's third largest coal producer after the United States and China. Pakistan has limited coal reserves of 3.4 billion short tons. Power generation accounts for about 70 percent of India’s total coal consumption, followed by steel and other industries. Despite the fact that Indian coal is generally of poor quality -- i.e., low in calorific content and high in ash -- and primarily located far from major consuming centers, Indian coal consumption is expected to increase to 544 million short tons (Mmst) by 2010, up from 431 Mmst in 2003. South Asia’s carbon emissions are expected to increase sharply in coming years as a result of increased coal consumption.
Coal currently plays a relatively minor role in Pakistan's energy mix (6 percent in 2003), but the discovery of large volumes of low-ash, low-sulfur lignite in the Tharparkar Desert in the Sindh province is expected to have a positive impact on consumption levels by fueling large electric power plants.
Bangladesh has small coal reserves, and has consumed little coal in the past. Bangladesh began commercial coal production in April 2003 with the opening of the Barapukuria Coal Mine, which is expected to produce one million short tons of coal per year, principally for electricity generation. This mine is being used to fuel the 250-MW Barapukuria Coal-Fired Power Plant in Parbotipur, which began commercial operation in January 2006. This facility, the first coal-fired power plant in Bangladesh, was built using the Chinese supplier’s financing. Another possible coal mining project at Khalashpir is under consideration as well.
Sri Lanka has practically no coal reserves and currently consumes very little coal. Sri Lanka has approved the development of its first coal-fired plant (300 MW) on its northern coast but plans to use imported coal for fuel.
As is the case in many developing regions, South Asia continues to rely heavily on biomass (i.e., animal waste, wood, etc.) for residential energy consumption, particularly in rural areas. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), biomass accounted for about 80 percent of residential energy consumption in 2000 and will account for 70 percent of total residential energy consumption by 2020. Because the primary end uses of biomass are cooking and heating, the expansion of electricity access, used primarily for lighting, is not expected to have a significant affect on biomass use in the near future.
In 2003, South Asia generated 663 billion kilowatt-hours (Bkwh) of electricity. Of this, around 81 percent was from conventional thermal power plants, 16 percent from hydroelectric plants, 3 percent from nuclear, and less than 1 percent from “other renewables” (like wind and solar). Also in 2003, India accounted for the vast majority (85 percent) of the region's electricity generation, followed by Pakistan (12 percent), Bangladesh (3 percent), Sri Lanka (1 percent), Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives (1 percent total). Regional electricity generation is expected to increase significantly in coming years. Natural gas is expected to displace some coal-fired generation in India, although recently there have been delays in importing natural gas. Regardless, the net level of coal-fired generation in South Asia is expected to rise. Hydroelectricity is expected to fuel new generation, primarily in Nepal and Bhutan. Non-hydroelectric “renewable” capacity (i.e., wind, solar, ocean, biomass, geothermal) is small at present, but it is increasing, with solar and wind power considered most promising.
Electricity demand in most of South Asia is currently outstripping supply, and the region is characterized by chronic shortages. Reasons for this situation include: shortfalls in generating capacity; low plant load factors due to aging generators and poor maintenance of equipment at existing plants (plus low-quality coal in many cases); and losses of power due to poor-quality transmission lines and theft. South Asia’s rapidly rising electricity demand has heightened the need for additional investment by independent power producers (IPPs). Unfortunately, bureaucratic obstacles and underdeveloped regulatory policies have led to construction delays and foreign investor disillusionment. As a result, many large IPP projects in the region have been delayed or canceled over the past two years. Electricity rates are widely subsidized in South Asia, and state electricity companies are faced with the challenge of paying IPPs their asking price for power while providing lower rates to their customers. Electricity companies also lose a substantial percentage to theft. The IMF and the World Bank have encouraged liberalization of South Asian power sectors, including the reduction of subsidies.
Discussions have been underway for some time among South Asian nations to develop a regional electricity grid connecting India, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh. Such a grid would lead to increased efficiencies and reduced power generation and transmission costs. Nepal and Bhutan have substantial untapped hydroelectricity potential that could be consumed domestically or exported to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
India accounts for about four-fifths of the electricity generated in South Asia. As of 2003, total generating capacity in India was 126 gigawatts (GW). India generates approximately 83 percent of its electricity from conventional thermal power plants, around 12 percent from hydroelectric plants (located mainly in the north and northeast of the country), and 3 percent from nuclear plants. India is facing serious power supply problems, with the Indian government citing current generation at 30 percent below demand. Although 80 percent of India's population has access to electricity, power outages and brownouts are common. In 2003, India generated 567 BkWh of electricity. Indian power demand is projected to grow to 1,216 BkWh in 2025.
The majority of power generated in India (approximately 55 percent) is fueled by coal. Much of India's new generation is fueled by natural gas, however, and the government has taken a long-term interest in expanding the country's hydropower capacity. The Indian government has a target of capacity additions of 100,000 MW over the next 10 years, but recent events suggest that this target will not be met. Between 1999 and 2001, several foreign IPP projects were canceled as a result of insolvency among India’s State Electricity Boards (SEBs). In June 2003, the government approved an electricity bill to eliminate controls on generation, transmission and distribution and reduce two major problems plaguing the sector: cross-subsidies and high accounts receivable. Many improvements occurring in the electricity sector are as a result of assistance from international organizations including the Asian Development Bank. In May 2004, the Indian government committed itself to power sector reform. This included licensing of companies for Inter-state trading of electric power. State transmission companies and SEBs have stopped trading electricity since June 2005 and Licensed Trading Companies have taken over the function of electricity trading.
In July 2005, the Prime Minister of India visited the U.S. and signed an agreement on nuclear issues. If this agreement is approved by the U.S. Senate, U.S. firms would be able to sell nuclear fuels and nuclear reactors to India. The agreement would require India to separate its civilian and military nuclear activities and put the civilian facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
As of 2003, Pakistan had 18 GW of installed electric generating capacity. Thermal plants (oil, gas, and coal) make up 64 percent of this capacity, with hydroelectricity constituting 34 percent and nuclear plants 2 percent. Pakistan currently maintains excess generation capacity, but because few of Pakistan's rural areas have access to electricity and less than half of the population is connected to the national grid, significant demand growth is expected in the long term. Rotating blackouts (“load shedding”) are necessary in some areas, and transmission losses are approximately 30 percent due to poor infrastructure and significant power theft. Pakistan's total power generating capacity has increased in recent years, due largely to foreign investment in the mid-1990s, but payment problems have discouraged significant new investment. The 1,450-MW Ghazi Barotha hydropower project was completed in 2003. A new hydro plant, the Kalabagh project, has been proposed; however, some have raised environmental objections. If approved, the Kalabagh plant would supply 2,400 to 3,600 MW.
Bangladesh maintains 3.6 GW of electricity generation capacity (2003E). As a result, only around 18 percent of the population (25 percent in urban areas and 10 percent in rural areas) has access to electricity, and per capita commercial energy consumption is among the lowest in the world (4.0 million Btu). Because power demand grew over 60 percent from 1993 to 2003, Bangladesh's Power System Master Plan (PSMP) foresees a doubling of required generating capacity at a cost of $4.4 billion. Bangladesh generates its electricity mainly at thermal power plants (94 percent), but also has some hydroelectric dams (6 percent).
Net electricity consumption in Sri Lanka doubled between 1993 and 2003. To satisfy the growing demand for electricity, the government secured a loan from the Asian Development Bank in late 2002 to expand its electricity infrastructure. In 2003, the country's installed generating capacity grew to 2.8 GW from to 2.1 GW in 2002. The government aims to provide electricity to 80 percent of the population by 2010.
Sri Lanka relies on hydropower for most of its electricity, making it vulnerable to fluctuations in rainfall. In an effort to diversify, the Sri Lankan government is working to attract foreign investors to build independent thermal power plants. A 163-MW diesel power project was built at Kelanitissa, in the southern part of the nation.
Nepal relies almost exclusively on hydroelectricity to meet its power requirements, and at the end of 2003, its installed capacity was 700 MW. Nepal has large untapped hydroelectric potential (estimated at 43,000 MW), which could be developed to provide for the 60 percent of the population without electricity, as well as for export. In March 2002, the 144-MW Kaligandaki “A” hydroelectric dam began generating electricity. In October 2002, Australia’s Snowy Mountains Hydro (SMEC) signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the development of the 750-MW West Seti hydroelectric dam. The project is under construction; it will export power primarily to India. Renewable power sources are increasing in Nepal through rural electrification programs which aim to lessen the disparity in electricity access between rural (30 percent) and urban (90 percent) areas. The overall quality of Nepal’s electricity infrastructure, however, is low and is frequently a target for attack by Maoist rebels.
Bhutan's hydropower potential is estimated at 30,000 MW. Hydropower is the dominant source of commercial energy for the country and sales of hydroelectricity exports to India provided 45 percent of the government's revenues and constituted an 11.6 percent share of GDP in 2001. India's Tata Power Company and the Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. have formed a partnership to construct the 1,020-MW Tala hydropower project in Bhutan and a 750-mile transmission line to export power produced by the Tala project to New Delhi and surrounding areas of India. The Tala project is scheduled to be commissioned in 2006.